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RECENT DECISIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BILLS OF ATTAINDER-LEGISLATIVE DENIAL OF 
SALARY APPROPRIATION-Plaintiff, a civil service employee of the Minnesota 
Department of Conservation, had held the position of Assistant Director 
of Game and Fish since its creation. In 1953 the legislature enacted an 
appropriations bill which included a provision that: "Of the amounts ap-
propriated for salaries . . . no part shall be used to pay the salary of an 
Assistant Director of Game and Fish."1 Plaintiff brought an action for a 
declaratory judgment against his immediate superior, contending that the 
rider was void. He introduced evidence to show that he had incurred the 
enmity of certain members of the legislature and that this seemingly 
prompted the passage of the rider. The trial court ruled that the rider 
fell within the federal and state constitutional prohibitions of bills of 
attainder.2 On appeal, held, reversed. The provision was simply a refusal 
of an appropriation for the salary of a certain office. It was not a bill of 
attainder since there was no evidence sufficient to show that the legislature 
intended this provision as punishment for a crime or some other act ad-
judged worthy of penalty. Starkweather v. Blair, (Minn. 1955) 71 N.W. 
(2d) 869. 
A bill of attainder is commonly defined as "a legislative act which inflicts 
punishment without a judicial trial."3 An inherent feature of these bills 
is the intention of the legislature that someone be punished for a particular 
act. Since most bill of attainder cases have involved the validity of loyalty 
oaths,4 there is little precedent for the problem of legislative discharge of 
government employees.5 The leading decision in this area, and one strik-
ingly similar to the principal case, ii; United States v. Lovett6 which in-
1 Minn. Laws (1953) c. 741, §38, p. 1013. 
2 U.S. CONST., art. I, §10; MINN. CONST., art. I, §11. 
3 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277 at 323 (1866). See also Ex parte 
Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333 (1866). These cases also settled the point that the char• 
acter of a bill of attainder is not altered by a failure to name a person, as long as it pro• 
vides a means of ascertaining his identity. 
Technically, a bill of attainder involves a sentence of death accompanied by forfeiture 
of property and corruption of the blood. Bills inflicting lesser punishment, termed "bills 
of pains and penalties" are considered within article I, §10 of the Federal Constitution. 
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch. (10 U.S.) 87 (1810). As to what constitutes sufficient punish-
ment to amount to a bill of attainder, see In re Yung Sing Hee, (C.C. Ore. 1888) 36 F. 
437 (Chinese exclusion act applied to citizen returning from abroad); McFarland v. 
American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 36 S.Ct. 498 (1916) (prohibition of certain 
business practices if applicable by nature only to the plaintiff); Jones v. Slick, (Fla. 1952) 
56 S. (2d) 459 (city officer fined, imprisoned, or removed if found guilty of disobeying a 
council order by a nvo-thirds vote of the city council). See also Gaines v. Buford, I Dana 
(31 Ky.) 480 (1833); Opinion to the House of Representatives, 80 R.I. 281, 96 A. (2d) 
623 (1953). For a discussion of bills of attainder in colonial America, see Thompson, 
"Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the American Revolution," 3 ILL. L. R.Ev. 81 (1908). 
4 Cummings v. Missouri, note 3 supra; Ex parte Garland, note 3 supra; Garner v. 
Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909 (1951). 
5 For a compilation of bill of attainder cases, see 90 L. Ed. 1267 (1946). See, gen-
erally, 63 YALE L.J. 844 (1954). 
6 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946), noted in 95 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 80 (1946); 45 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 98 (1946); 46 CoL. L. R.Ev. 849 (1946). 
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volved a rider to a congressional appropriations act which provided that 
no money made available by that act or any subsequent act was to be used 
to pay the salaries of Lovett and two other executive department employees.7 
The majority of the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, held 
that the provision was a bill of attainder, construing the statute to bar 
permanently the three employees from the government service. The Court 
of Claims, in its decision in the Lovett case, stated that "a mere denial of 
appropriation, however unjust it might be . . . could not successfully be 
questioned ... " but that Congress had gone further by prohibiting all 
future employment by the government.8 In the principal case, the court 
distinguished the Lovett case on this basis and said that the Minnesota act 
did not bar the plaintiff from all positions, but left him free to fill any 
other post. Interpretations of the Lovett case by lower federal courts in-
dicate the validity of this distinction.9 In addition, the Minnesota court 
declined to find a bill of attainder in the principal case on the basis of a 
lack of the requisite intent by the legislature to inflict "punishment." The 
court was unwilling to resort to the sparse records of the debates and com-
mittee hearings of the Minnesota legislature nor did it feel justified in 
relying on evidence of animosity between plaintiff and individual members 
of the legislature.10 Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in the 
Lovett case, declined to find a bill of attainder because of the failure of the 
act to contain a declaration of guilt. Like the court in the principal case, 
he refused to go behind the act to investigate its motivation, declaring that 
the term "bill of attainder" has a fixed meaning in the Constitution, and 
that acts which deviate from the historical form of these bills are beyond 
the scope of the prohibition.11 Certainly the principal case presents an 
opportunity to reevaluate both the Lovett decision and the minority posi-
tion that the bill of attainder concept should be restricted to its traditional 
form.12 
Kenneth H. Haynie 
7 57 Stat. L. 450 (1943). 
8 104 Ct. Cl. 557, 66 F. Supp. 142 at 149 (1945). See Washington v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 
1949) 84 F. Supp. 964, affd. sub nom. Washington v. McGrath, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. 
(2d) 375, affd. 341 U.S. 923, 71 S.Ct. 795 (1951), for the statement that there have been 
many occasions where Congress has included _such riders in appropriations acts and that 
those provisions had not been successfully attacked as bills of attainder. 
9 Washington v. Clark, note 8 supra; Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. 
(2d) 46, affd. 341 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 669 (1951). See also Garner v. Board of Public Works, 
341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909 (1951). . 
10 Principal case at 875-878. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 
(1946), the majority of the Supreme Court was willing to go to the House committee 
hearings and debates to find that Congress was discharging the employees for alleged 
subversive activity. The Minnesota Legislature does not have such complete records. 
3.1328 U.S. 303 at 322-327, 66 S.Gt. 1073 (1946). A similar view was propounded by 
Justice Miller's dissent in Ex parte Garland, note 3 supra, at 382. See Norville, "Bill of 
Attainder-A Rediscovered Weapon Against Discriminatory Legislation," 26 ORE. L. REv. 
78 (1947), for the suggestion that the Lovett case was incorrectly decided and that a better 
ground for the decision would have been denial of due process because of the arbitrary 
classification. But see 95 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 80 (1946). 
12 In addition, there is some authority for suggesting that the rider might be consid-
